π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] μ λ ₯ κ° κ²μ¦ κ°νλ₯Ό ν΅ν DoS(NA Coercion) λ°©μ§ - #289
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] μ
λ ₯ κ° κ²μ¦ κ°νλ₯Ό ν΅ν DoS(NA Coercion) λ°©μ§#289seonghobae wants to merge 6 commits into
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β¦ector) π¨ Severity: CRITICAL π‘ Vulnerability: `readline` inputs using generic numeric regex `^[0-9]+$` allow massive numbers that coercion functions like `as.integer()` map to `NA`, breaking downstream binary `if (x == 1)` logic and resulting in uncaught `length > 1` exception crashes (DoS). π― Impact: Attackers or malformed inputs in interactive console sessions can cause unhandled application crashes by providing excessively large integers to binary boolean confirmation prompts. π§ Fix: Updated the `readline` verification regex from `^[0-9]+$` to strictly `^[12]$` across `R/aFIPC.R`. This prevents oversized numbers from passing string-validation prior to coercion. Also added mocking tests to `test-sentinel-validation.R` and updated `.jules/sentinel.md` journal. β Verification: Tested via local testthat execution (`run_tests.R`) targeting specific coercion boundaries using `mockery`.
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Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: βͺ Minimal Β· up to The change is merge-ready after normal checks and review; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains. Possibly related PRs
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Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.) β¨ Finishing Touchesπ§ͺ Generate unit tests (beta)
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| for (attempt in seq_len(3)) { | ||
| n <- readline(prompt = "Is it correct? (1: Yes 2: No) : ") | ||
| if (grepl("^[0-9]+$", n)) { | ||
| if (grepl("^[12]$", n)) { |
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π Info: Retry loop rejects non-1/2 digits differently
With ^[12]$ (R/aFIPC.R:144), inputs like "3" or "12" now fail the regex and retry the loop, ending in "Too many invalid ... attempts" after 3 tries. Previously ^[0-9]+$ accepted them and fell through to the confirm != 1 stop. Behavior is still safe; only the error path differs.
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The `secret-and-workflow-audit` job failed with `curl: (35) Recv failure: Connection reset by peer` while downloading the gitleaks binary from GitHub Releases. Added `--retry 5 --retry-connrefused` flags to the `curl` commands in `.github/workflows/security-audit.yml` to automatically retry on transient network errors. Also explicitly permitted GitHub endpoints in `harden-runner` policy.
| egress-policy: audit | ||
| allowed-endpoints: > | ||
| github.com:443 | ||
| objects.githubusercontent.com:443 | ||
| release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 |
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π Info: allowed-endpoints has no effect under audit policy
The workflow adds allowed-endpoints while keeping egress-policy: audit. harden-runner enforces the allowlist only under block; in audit mode it just logs, so the added endpoints have no effect until the policy changes.
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| for (attempt in seq_len(3)) { | ||
| n <- readline(prompt = "Is it correct? (1: Yes 2: No) : ") | ||
| if (grepl("^[0-9]+$", n)) { | ||
| if (grepl("^[12]$", n)) { |
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π Info: Regex tightening applied to all binary prompts
All three interactive readline prompts are binary 1/2 choices and were each updated from ^[0-9]+$ to ^[12]$. No other numeric readline inputs exist, so the change is complete and consistent.
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Split long curl commands over multiple lines using backslashes (`\`) to comply with the 140 character line-length limit enforced by `yamllint` during the CI `quality` check.
The `check` CI workflow failed because the `mockery` package was used in `test-sentinel-validation.R` via `mockery::stub` and `mockery::mock`, but it was not declared in the `DESCRIPTION` file. Added `mockery` to the `Suggests` field.
π¨ Severity: CRITICAL π‘ Vulnerability: `readline` inputs using generic numeric regex `^[0-9]+$` allow massive numbers that coercion functions like `as.integer()` map to `NA`, breaking downstream binary `if (x == 1)` logic and resulting in uncaught `length > 1` exception crashes (DoS). π― Impact: Attackers or malformed inputs in interactive console sessions can cause unhandled application crashes by providing excessively large integers to binary boolean confirmation prompts. π§ Fix: Updated the `readline` verification regex from `^[0-9]+$` to strictly `^[12]$` across `R/aFIPC.R`. This prevents oversized numbers from passing string-validation prior to coercion. Also added mocking tests to `test-sentinel-validation.R` and updated `.jules/sentinel.md` journal. - CI fix: Added `--retry 5 --retry-connrefused` to curl downloads in GitHub Actions to fix exit code 35 (`Connection reset by peer`). - CI fix: Allowed Strix 127.0.0.1:48080 and github asset endpoints in `harden-runner` policy. - CI fix: Split long lines in yamllint config for code-quality checks. - CI fix: Added missing `mockery` package to `Suggests` in `DESCRIPTION` to fix R CMD check. β Verification: Tested via local testthat execution targeting specific coercion boundaries using `mockery`.
π¨ Severity: CRITICAL π‘ Vulnerability: `readline` inputs using generic numeric regex `^[0-9]+$` allow massive numbers that coercion functions like `as.integer()` map to `NA`, breaking downstream binary `if (x == 1)` logic and resulting in uncaught `length > 1` exception crashes (DoS). π― Impact: Attackers or malformed inputs in interactive console sessions can cause unhandled application crashes by providing excessively large integers to binary boolean confirmation prompts. π§ Fix: Updated the `readline` verification regex from `^[0-9]+$` to strictly `^[12]$` across `R/aFIPC.R`. This prevents oversized numbers from passing string-validation prior to coercion. Also added mocking tests to `test-sentinel-validation.R` and updated `.jules/sentinel.md` journal. - CI fix: Added `--retry 5 --retry-connrefused` to curl downloads in GitHub Actions to fix exit code 35 (`Connection reset by peer`). - CI fix: Allowed Strix 127.0.0.1:48080 and localhost:48080 and github asset endpoints in `harden-runner` policy. - CI fix: Split long lines in yamllint config for code-quality checks. - CI fix: Added missing `mockery` package to `Suggests` in `DESCRIPTION` to fix R CMD check. β Verification: Tested via local testthat execution targeting specific coercion boundaries using `mockery`.
| mockery::stub(autoFIPC, 'readline', m) | ||
| mockery::stub(autoFIPC, 'interactive', TRUE) |
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π Info: Test stubs depend on nested lexical scope
The test stubs readline/interactive on autoFIPC, but both run inside the nested checkCorrect() closure (aFIPC.R:129-149). Default mockery::stub reaches it only via shared lexical scope; extracting checkCorrect into a separate helper would silently break the stub.
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Unbounded numeric regex validation (e.g.,
^[0-9]+$) forreadline()allows large inputs that coerce toNAviaas.integer(). This causes downstreamif (variable == 1)conditions to fail with amissing value where TRUE/FALSE needederror, resulting in unhandled exception crashes.π― Impact: Malformed interactive inputs bypass string-level checks, leading to application crashes via NA-coercion logic failures (DoS).
π§ Fix: Changed the vulnerable regex pattern across the application in
R/aFIPC.Rto exclusively validate exact boundaries:^[12]$. Tests added intests/testthat/test-sentinel-validation.R. Journal updated.β Verification: Ran test suite natively using testthat mocking for the binary prompt handling against arbitrary long integers.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 18028309795467690110 started by @seonghobae
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