fix(auth): enforce Sentinel authorization boundaries - #131
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Reviewed commit: a2782f5b91
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| RequestTokenHasAudience(c, "sentinel"), | ||
| RequestTokenHasScope(c, "sentinel:all"), | ||
| )) | ||
| Require(c, RequestTokenHasResourceScope(c, authz.UserReadScope)) |
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When a third-party OAuth app is granted user:read, RequestTokenHasResourceScope succeeds without checking the audience or subject, so GET /users now returns every user. GetAllUsers populates fields including email, phone number, birthday, clothing sizes, and SAE registration number, even though the consent UI describes this scope as reading “your profile”; before this change the collection was limited to Sentinel callers. Keep the bulk directory first-party/admin/internal-only or return an appropriately sanitized directory response.
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| RequestTokenHasEntityID(c, entityID), | ||
| RequestUserIsAdmin(c), | ||
| )) | ||
| Require(c, RequestTokenHasResourceScope(c, authz.UserReadScope)) |
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For a third-party token with user:read, this gate now permits requesting any entityID, rather than only the token subject. service.GetEntityByID populates email and phone authentication records plus EntityExternalAuth rows whose JSON includes provider access_token and refresh_token fields, so a known entity ID—obtainable from the newly exposed /users collection—can disclose another user's PII and stored provider credentials. Preserve the previous self/admin/internal restriction or expose a sanitized profile DTO for scoped reads.
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sentinel:internalfor allowlisted Sentinel service accounts and rotate existing internal credentials at startupsentinel:allas the first-party user scope while requiring self, owner, or Admins authorization for writesgroups:writeOAuth scope and keep both Sentinel-only scopes out of third-party consent