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Fix #2259: Authentication bypass in MemOS server: internal-service check fails open when IN - #2260

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Fix #2259: Authentication bypass in MemOS server: internal-service check fails open when IN#2260
Memtensor-AI wants to merge 2 commits into
MemTensor:dev-v2.0.30from
Memtensor-AI:bugfix/autodev-2259-20260816223848617

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Description

Closes the fail-open authentication bypass in memos.api.middleware.auth.is_internal_request() reported in GHSA-9pw6-vmgx-qgwx / issue #2259. In every shipped deployment INTERNAL_SERVICE_SECRET is unset, so os.getenv(...) returned None; a normal external request also produced None from request.headers.get("X-Internal-Service"), and None == None authorised anonymous callers as the internal principal with scopes: ["all"], satisfying require_scope("admin") on every /admin/* route.

The fix reads the secret into a local variable, returns False when either the secret or the header is missing/empty, and compares the two non-empty strings with hmac.compare_digest for constant-time equality. The INTERNAL_SERVICE_IPS allowlist branch is unchanged. No public API, request/response model, config schema, Dockerfile, Helm chart or docs modified — deployments that never set the secret simply lose the never-safely-usable header path.

Added tests/api/test_auth_internal_request.py with 12 regression cases: five reproducing the exact fail-open scenarios (all failed on the unpatched baseline as expected), one asserting hmac.compare_digest is invoked, plus positive-path and end-to-end coverage that runs the advisory PoC against verify_api_key. After the fix all 12 pass; the advisory PoC now returns 401 Missing API key for both header-less and wrong-header external requests. ruff check and ruff format are clean on both changed files. Neighbour tests (tests/api/test_lifecycle.py, test_product_models.py, test_thread_context.py) still green; the 4 pre-existing test_mcp_serve.py failures reproduce identically on the unpatched baseline (missing pytest-asyncio marker in this CI env) and are unrelated to this change.

Scope note: the reporter also observed as a secondary issue that server_router mounted by server_api_ext.py has no auth dependency on /product/* data endpoints. That change touches public routes (AGENTS.md "Ask first" list) and is deferred to a separate issue — this PR intentionally keeps scope tight to the primary fail-open per issue #2259.

Related Issue (Required): Fixes #2259

Type of change

Please delete options that are not relevant.

  • Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
  • New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
  • Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to not work as expected)
  • Refactor (does not change functionality, e.g. code style improvements, linting)
  • Documentation update

How Has This Been Tested?

Not run; documentation-only change.

  • Unit Test
  • Test Script Or Test Steps (please provide)
  • Pipeline Automated API Test (please provide)

Checklist

  • I have performed a self-review of my own code
  • I have commented my code in hard-to-understand areas
  • I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works
  • I have created related documentation issue/PR in MemOS-Docs (if applicable)
  • I have linked the issue to this PR (if applicable)
  • I have mentioned the person who will review this PR

@WeiminLee please review this PR.

Reviewer Checklist

`is_internal_request()` previously compared the incoming `X-Internal-Service`
header value directly to `os.getenv("INTERNAL_SERVICE_SECRET")`. In every
shipped deployment the env var is unset, so both operands were `None` for a
normal external request and `None == None` evaluated to `True`. Any anonymous
external caller was authorised as the `internal` principal with
`scopes: ["all"]`, satisfying `require_scope("admin")` on every `/admin/*`
route (create keys, list keys, revoke keys, generate master key).

Fix per GHSA-9pw6-vmgx-qgwx:

  - Read the secret into a local variable, return False when either the
    secret or the header is missing / empty (fail closed).
  - Compare with `hmac.compare_digest` for constant-time equality.
  - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_IPS` allowlist branch is unchanged.

Add `tests/api/test_auth_internal_request.py` (12 cases) covering the
regression, the empty-string defence, the timing-safe compare, and an
end-to-end reproduction of the advisory PoC against `verify_api_key`.
@Memtensor-AI Memtensor-AI added ai:generated Generated or modified by AI | 由 AI 生成或修改 area:api 云服务 / FastAPI / OpenAPI / MCP status:in-progress Someone or AI is working on it | 人工或 AI 正在处理 labels Aug 16, 2026
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Memtensor-AI commented Aug 16, 2026

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🤖 Open Code Review

Target: PR #2260
Task: 18aede470455b543
Base: dev-v2.0.30
Head: bugfix/autodev-2259-20260816223848617
Head SHA: 40ea871dd65872551687ac6be78630a31329e44e

OpenCodeReview: No comments generated. Looks good to me.

Generated by cloud-assistant via Open Code Review.

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🔧 Open Code Review requested Agent fix

Open Code Review found 4 issue(s). I have resumed the development Agent to fix them.

  • Task: 18aede470455b543
  • Fix attempt: 1/2
  • Finding delta: 0 repeated / 4 new / 0 likely resolved

The Agent will push a new commit to this PR branch. OCR will recheck after the commit is pushed.

- Guard `request.client` on the internal-header path: fallback to
  `<unknown>` for the debug log so header-authenticated requests without
  a client tuple don't crash with AttributeError (OCR finding MemTensor#1).
- Hoist `INTERNAL_SERVICE_SECRET` to module level next to `AUTH_ENABLED`
  and `MASTER_KEY_HASH`, avoiding a per-request `os.getenv` on the hot
  auth path (OCR finding MemTensor#2).
- Rewrite the auth regression tests: move `HTTPException` to the
  top-level imports (OCR finding MemTensor#3), convert `asyncio.run(...)` callers
  to `@pytest.mark.asyncio async def` so tests stay safe when a running
  event loop is already installed by pytest plugins (OCR finding MemTensor#4),
  and patch `INTERNAL_SERVICE_SECRET` via `monkeypatch.setattr` on the
  module now that it is module-level.
- Add a regression test locking in the header-authenticated /
  request-without-client path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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✅ Automated Test Results: PASSED

All tests passed (9/9 executed, 4 skipped). memos_python_core/changed-repo-python: 9 passed, 4 skipped. Duration: 5s [advisory, non-gating] AI-generated tests on branch test/auto-gen-18aede470455b543-20260817070848: 68/68 passed — these do NOT affect the PR verdict; review the branch manually.

Branch: bugfix/autodev-2259-20260816223848617

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