ci: sign Docker images and attach build provenance (backport of #4451) - #4523
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Backport of #4451 to V6.2. The sign job runs separately so the OIDC credential is never exposed to the third-party build actions, and it is skipped on pull requests because forks get no OIDC token. Assisted-by: AI
stevenvegt
requested review from
gerardsn,
reinkrul and
woutslakhorst
as code owners
September 10, 2026 12:55
reinkrul
approved these changes
Sep 10, 2026
Contributor
zizmor (via qlty) flags the missing permissions block on the workflow and on the docker job. Same layout as master: deny-all at the top, contents read for the build job, id-token write only for the sign job. Assisted-by: AI
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Backport of #4451 to V6.2. Adds Sigstore keyless signing plus SLSA provenance and SPDX SBOM attestations to the image build, so the next V6.2 patch release ships signed with a bill of materials. Users verify with:
Differences from the master change, all due to the branch's workflow layout:
permissionsblock and uses version tags for its actions; that is left as is. The newsignjob carries its ownpermissions: id-token: write(which drops every other permission for that job) and pins its two actions by SHA, since it is the job that holds the OIDC credential.Verification: the workflow YAML parses, and a local Sphinx build of the docs succeeds with no warnings for the changed page. The sign job is skipped on
pull_request, so the first real check is the workflow run on this branch after merge; the next tag build should be verified with the command above.Not for release yet; part of the batch of fixes before the next V6.2 patch tag, together with #4507 and the pending backport of #4496 (version stamping).